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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GUARANTY NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
VS. 
OCCIDENTAL FIRE AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 18964 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment based 
on an alleged overpayment of a settlement for personal 
injuries arising out of an automobile-truck accident. 
The original personal injury lawsuit was settled by the 
parties to this action, and then the plaintiff filed 
a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of 
the respective rights of the two insurance carriers. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant filed Motions 
for Summary Judgment based on stipulated facts. The Third 
Judicial District Court granted plaintiff's Motion and 
denied defendant's Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, Occidental Fire and Casualty Company, 
seeks a reversal of the lower court judgment and a 
determination that the plaintiff is the primary insurance 
carrier. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 17, 1978, DeLoy Bisel was driving his 1977 
International tractor and collided with an automobile 
being driven by Brenda M. Howcroft. As a result of the 
collision, Brenda Howcroft, Lisa Howcroft and Karen 
Howcroft all sustained serious personal injuries. The 
Howcrofts initiated a lawsuit in the Third Judicial 
District Court and sought damages for these personal 
injuries in excess of $800,000. 
At the time of the collision, Mr. Bisel was 
operating his truck under a Hauling Contract for Norwood 
Transportation, Inc. (R. 91-92.) Also, at the time of 
the accident, Bisel had a policy of insurance covering 
the truck with Occidental Fire and Casualty Company, 
the appellant herein (hereinafter designated "Occidental.") 
(R. 57-58.) 
At the same time, Norwood Transportation, Inc., had 
policy of insurance with Guaranty National Insurance 
Company, the plaintiff-respondent herein (hereinafter 
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c i g ria ted "Guaranty. u (R. 58.) 
The personal injury lawsuit filed by the Howcrofts 
• ic, finally terminated by settlement for the sum of $150, 000. 
011e Hundred Thousand Dollars of that amount was paid by Guaranty, 
and $50,000 was paid by Occidental. Guaranty paid its 
policy limits under protest, taking the position that it 
was the excess carrier to Occidental. Occidental, of 
course, took the position that Guaranty was primary and 
that Occidental's policy was excess. (R. 59.) 
Hauling Contract 
The agreement which was in effect at the time of the 
accident between Bisel and Norwood Transportation, Inc., 
is set forth in its entirety at pages 91-92 of the record. 
There are two paragraphs in the contract which are of some 
import in this case: 
12. Contractor hereby indemnifies and saves 
harmless the company from any loss or liability 
for damages of every description arising out of 
the operation of the equipment herein described 
beyond the terms and conditions of this contract. 
(Emphasis added.) 
13. Company agrees to assume full responsi-
bility for liability to the public arising out 
of the operation of the equipment leased hereby, 
during the period the equipment is operated in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of 
this contract. 
Under paragraph 6 of the Stipulation of Facts, there 
is no question but that DeLoy Bisel was operating his tractor 
under the terms of the Hauling Contract at the time of the 
accident. (R. 58.) 
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The Occidental Policy 
The Occidental policy which was in effect at the t 1 , 
of the accident issued to DeLoy Bisel had a "Long Haul 
Truckman" endorsement. The endorsement provided, amonq 
other things: 
With respect to any automobile of the 
commercial type while leased or loaned to 
any person or organization, other than 
the named insured, engaged in the business 
of transporting property by automobile for 
others, or any other hired private passenger 
automobile insured on the "cost of hire" 
basis, or any non-owned automobile, this 
insurance shall be excess insurance over 
any other valid and collectible insurance. 
(R. 67.) 
The Guarantv Polirv 
The Guaranty policy, which covered Norwood Transpor-
tation, Inc., at the time of the accident certified that 
Public Service Commission filings had been made in the States 
of Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Oregon, and Montana, and that 
a filing was made with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
(R. 76.) 
In addition, the Guarantee policy had a "Truckman" 
endorsement which provided, in part: 
With respect to (1) any automobile 
of the commercial type while leased or 
loaned to any person or organization, 
other than the named insured engaged 
in the business of transporting property 
by automobile for others, or (2) any 
hired private passenger automobile, 
or (3) any non-owned automobile, the 
insurance under this endorsement 
shall be excess insurance over any other 
valid and collectible insurance, whether 
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primary, excess or contingent, available 
to the insured. Otherwise, the insurance 
under this endorsement is primary coverage. 
(R. 83.) 
The policy issued by Guaranty to Norwood Transportation 
provided for payment of premiums based on the mileage of 
the entire fleet of Norwood Transportation. There was not a 
schedule of specific trucks or vehicles set forth in the 
Guaranty policy. (R. 88.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE GUARANTY POLICY IS PRIMhRY AND THE 
OCCIDENTAL POLICY IS EXCESS. THE LOWER 
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING TO THE CONTRARY. 
We are thus faced with two policies which cover the 
accident and provide indemnity for the tort liability of 
Mr. Bisel and Norwood Transportation, Inc. Both policies 
contain excess clauses applicable in the event there is 
other valid, collectible insurance. The Occidental policy 
contains a specific excess provision in the Long Haul 
Truckman endorsement, applicable where the insured vehicle 
is used under lease to a motor carrier. The Guaranty 
policy in this case is issued and certified pursuant to 
Federal regulations and state regulations which require 
the licensed common carrier to provide proof of financial 
responsibility by insurance or otherwise and to certify 
the existence of such insurance by filing a certificate 
with the ICC. 
The appellant has found no Utah cases precisely in 
point. There are two distinct lines of authority. Some of 
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the cases disregard the fact that filings had been made 
with the ICC and/or Public Service CoffiPlission certifyinq 
insurance and decide that the poliry written on the 
specific vehicle is primary. See, Carolina Casualt:; 
Insurance Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 
595 F.2d 128 (Third Cir. 1979); Carolina Casualty Insurance 
Company v. Transport Indemnity Company, 488 F.2d 790 
(10th Cir. 1973). 
The appellant submits, however, that the better 
reasoned line of authority reaches the opposite result. 
In a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Arizona 
on September 30, 1982, which had not been published 
when this case was argued to lower court on August 12, 
1982, the issues are discussed in detail. Transport 
Indemnity Co. v. Carolina Casualty Co., 652 P.2d 134 (Ariz. 
1982). In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court discussed 
all of the issues involved, including the specific language 
of the two policies. It specifically rejected the holding 
in the Tenth Circuit opinion of Carolina Casualty v. Transoor 
Indemnity, supra, because in that case both insurance carrier' 
had filed ICC certification. The Court then went on to point 
out that although both policies had specific excess clauses, 
the policy covering the lessee (in this case Guaranty) was 
rendered unenforceable by virtue of the provisions of the 
Interstate Commerce Act and the regulations that were enacte 
thereunder. Transport Indemnity Co. v. Carolina Casualty 
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Insurance, 652 P.2d at 139. See also, Argonaut Insurance 
Co. v. National Indemnity Co., 435 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 
1971); Hagans v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 465 F.2d 1249 
(10th Cir. 1972). 
Anticipating that Guaranty will argue that the 
ICC endorsement and the language in the Hauling Contract 
are only effective with regard to disputes between the 
shipper and members of the general public who are injured, 
and that insurers are free between themselves to contract 
for allocation of the risk, Occidental still submits that, 
at most, its policy extends only excess coverage for 
any accident which occurs while the described vehicle is 
leased to a common carrier. This is the very reason, in 
fact, for the excess provision in the Long Haul Truckman's 
endorsement. See Transport Indemnity Co. v. Home Indemnity 
535 F.2d 232 (3rd Cir. 1976). Further, appellant 
contends that the Court cannot disregard the provisions 
of Federal law and that the ICC filing mandates that the 
Guarantee policy be primary. Truck Insurance Exchange v. 
Transport Indemnity Co., 180 Mont. 419, at 432, 591 P.2d 
188, at 195 (1979). 
In the final part of its analysis, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that even if the ICC endorsement had not been 
present in the policy provided to the lessee, it would be 
compelled to decide the issue exactly the same based on 
its interpretation of the Interstate Conunerce Act. It 
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said: 
The intent of Congress was not just to 
provide assurance that the claims of shippers 
and inJured members of the public would 
ultimately be paid. The intent was to 
permit the ICC to abolish and regulate a 
wide range of practices which had come into 
existence in the trucking industry "by 
imposing 'responsibility-and-control' regula-
tions governing the regulation of non-owned 
vehicles." 
Thus, we disagree with the concept that 
all loss allocations between private parties 
are permissible so long as they do not 
directly prevent compensation to the public. 
In some cases private regulations respecting 
loss allegation do not significantly intrude 
in the Federal regulatory scheme and are 
permissible .... However, in all cases the 
Federal policy must be considered paramount 
and affects the interpretation and construction 
to be given the contractual agreements. We 
believe here that Federal policy does affect 
the determination of primary and excess status 
between carriers regardless of the presence 
or absence of the ICC clause physically 
attached to the policy. 
First, given the fact that the Congressional 
Act imposes direct liability on the lessee and 
given further that the lessee's insurance policy 
is proof of the lessee's financial responsibility 
for that very liability, we believe that the 
purposes which Congress and the ICC intended to 
accomplish in regulating the trip lease problem 
are better served if the lessee's insurance is 
considered "responsible for primary coverage, 
both as a matter of law and of public policy." 
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Carolina Casualty 
Insurance, 652 P.2d at 143-44. 
The respondent, Guaranty, respectfully suggests 
that requiring primary coverage from the lessee's carrier 
has the effect of establishing a uniform rule fixing 
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rrimary financial responsibility for defense and payment 
of claims in all cases involving trip leases. This policy 
would have the effect of aiding in the disposition of claims 
without delays resulting from litigation between the 
insurers in order to determine which of them is to provide 
primary coverage and which is excess coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant recognizes that there are two distinct 
lines of authority deciding the issues presented in this 
case. Although there are no Utah cases precisely in point, 
the most recent, and the best reasoned of the cases deciding 
these issues holds that the insurance carrier providing 
coverage to the lessee is primary and that the insurance 
carrier providing coverage to the lessor is excess. For 
these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the lower 
court's decision should be reversed, and that judgment 
should be entered in favor of the appellant and against 
the respondent, finding that the respondent is the primary 
insurance carrier and appellant is excess. 
Submitted this day of April, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
David W. Slagle 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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